Global Britain in a competitive age : strategy of the Integrated Review

Since 2010, the UK government has conducted a strategic review at five-yearly intervals, a pattern which it has maintained, at least formally, despite the strategically destabilising effects of Brexit and the Trump administration. Accordingly, on 26 February 2020 the Prime Minister announced the next iteration, albeit one which would he maintained go ‘beyond the parameters of a traditional review’. COVID-19 understandably delayed the publication of the Integrated Review until March 2021. This article examines the results, using the prism of strategy to examine the review’s coherence. Global Britain in a Competitive Age is as aspirational as its original ambition suggested it should be, but is light on specific policies and their delivery. The accompanying publications from the Ministry of Defence contain more substance, but their implications are not sufficiently aligned with either foreign policy or the possible eventuality of armed conflict, nor do they allow for capabilities commensurate with the scale of the task which ‘Global Britain’ anticipates.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

Michael Howard and Clausewitz

The English translation of Carl von Clausewitz’s On War by Michael Howard and Peter Paret has had a major impact on how Clausewitz is read today, especially in the United States and Britain. Howard in particular was determined to make Clausewitz doubly relevant – as one soldier speaking to other soldiers and as an author whose views on war had continuing purchase. However, the result is a text which, in reflecting the issues of its day, is not fully reflective of what Clausewitz himself said and has itself become dated.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

An Interview with Professor Sir Hew Strachan

Professor Sir Hew Strachan is a British military historian, currently Professor of International Relations at the University of St Andrews. He is well known for his studies of the British Army, the history of the First World War, and military history from the 18th century to date, including contemporary strategic studies. During his career, he held various academic positions such as senior lecturer in War Studies at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Professor of Modern History at the University of Glasgow, Chichele Professor of the History of War at All Souls at Oxford. He was knighted in the 2013 New Year Honours for his services to the Ministry of Defence and he also won the Pritzker Literature Award for Lifetime Achievement in Military Writing. In 2017 Strachan was elected Fellow of the British Academy (FBA), the United Kingdom’s national academy for the humanities and social sciences. Some of his famous works include The First World War, Vol. 1: To Arms, European Armies and the Conduct of War, Wellington’s Legacy: The Reform of the British Army 1830-54, From Waterloo to Balaclava: Tactics, Technology and the British Army, The Politics of the British Army, Clausewitz’s On War: a Biography, etc

Military maladaptation : counterinsurgency and the politics of failure

Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics.PostprintPeer reviewe

Towards a typology of non-state actors in ‘hybrid warfare’: proxy, auxiliary, surrogate and affiliated forces

This article presents a typology of armed non-state actors in hybrid warfare: proxy, auxiliary, surrogate and affiliated forces. By focusing on the kinetic domain of hybrid warfare, the article offers a corrective to a debate that has so far ignored variation in roles and functions of non-state actors and their relationships with states and their regular forces. As a denominator, ‘hybrid’ identifies a combination of battlespaces, types of operations—military or non-kinetic—and a blurring of actors with the scope of achieving strategic objectives by creating exploitable ambiguity. However, there has been a disproportionate focus on what hybrid war supposedly combines across battlespaces and domains (socio-political, economic, informational), at the expense of who and how. Using the Ukrainian crisis as a theory-building exercise, the article suggests a four-category schema that identifies non-state actor functions as a tool to better represent the complex franchise of violence that is found nested next to non-military operations in hybrid activity. In so doing, the article speaks to a call for better conceptualization the role of non-state violent actors in civil war, in general, and in hybrid warfare, in particular